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)
)
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)
)
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)
)
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)
)
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)
______________________________)

NO. 45723
TWIN FALLS COUNTY NO. CR 2011-2219

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Subsequent to Mr. Hall’s plea of guilty to aggravated battery, the district court imposed
an eight-year sentence, with four years determinate, and retained jurisdiction. Mr. Hall was then
placed on probation, but due to subsequent violations, he came back before the court. The
district court revoked Mr. Hall’s probation and executed his previously imposed sentence. On
appeal, Mr. Hall asserts the district court abused its discretion when revoking probation by
failing apply correct legal standards and unreasonably failing to fully consider his mental
condition and other mitigation evidence.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Back in February 2011, Mr. Hall was working at his job with TDK Auto Service.
(Confidential Exhibits containing September 29, 2011, Presentence Investigation (“PSI”), p.2.)
Mr. Hall had his headphones on, and was detailing a vehicle with the use of a knife, attempting
to scrape out the sticky residue on the floor. (Disposition Hearing Transcript, January 5, 2018
(“Tr.”), p.8, Ls.14-21.) His co-worker, Donald Cordell, went up behind Mr. Hall and made some
type of contact with him. (PSI, p.2.) Mr. Cordell contended (for some unexplained reason) that
he put his chin on Mr. Hall’s shoulder. (PSI, p.2.) Mr. Hall, surprised and spooked, turned
around and stabbed Mr. Cordell in the abdomen. (PSI, p.2, Tr., p.8, L.22 – p.9, L.4.) Mr. Hall
contended that just before he struck Mr. Cordell, he felt something heavy on his back, and then
Mr. Cordell started throwing punches. (Tr., p.8, L.22 – p.9, L.4.) Mr. Cordell relayed that he
and Mr. Hall were friends and he did not know why Mr. Hall did that. (PSI, p. 2.) Mr. Hall was
arrested and taken into custody. He was formally charged with aggravated battery and a deadly
weapon enhancement for the use of a knife. (R., p.32.)
Mr. Hall entered a guilty plea to the crime in August of 2011, and was sentenced to an
eight-year term, with four years indeterminate. The court retained jurisdiction and Mr. Hall was
placed on a rider. (R., p.73.) When Mr. Hall was assessed for placement on the rider by the
Idaho Department of Corrections (“IDOC”), they noted that Mr. Hall “has significant mental
health needs that can only be provided at our most substantial mental health setting. The
offender will receive a traditional rider opportunity in conjunction with concurrent mental health
services . . . “ (R., p.92.) They also noted, “no bed space is available for the recommended
placement. Based upon assessed need, the offender will be placed into the next highest level of
intervention.” (R., p.92.)
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When Mr. Hall returned to court in May 2012 after serving his rider, the district court
placed him on probation for ten years. (R., p.95.) His probation appears to have been transferred
to Kootenai County. (R. p.110.) Approximately a year and one-half later, Mr. Hall was brought
before the court for his first probation violation, on allegations that he drank, had been involved
in a DUI collision and left the scene, and committed a petit theft at a Target store. (R., p.110.)
Mr. Hall admitted being in violation of his probation, but despite the new crimes and concerns
they raised, at that time, his Senior Probation and Parole Officer recommended another retained
jurisdiction based upon his progress:
When Mr. Hall was first placed on probation, he was highly institutionalized and
mistrusting of authority. At his request, I saw him practically weekly until spring
of this year. He made effort to overcome his mistrust of authority, he attended
treatment, 12 step meetings and eventually this spring came to a point of
confidence . . . Because of Mr. Hall’s forward movement and new attitudes and
beliefs, I believe Mr. Hall would obtain more benefit from another Retained
Jurisdiction and take advantage of more intense counseling and programming in a
custodial setting so that he can focus fully on his personal issues and his
recovery.
(R., pp.111, 144.) (emphasis added.) The district court revoked Mr. Hall’s probation on July 22,
2014, and sent him on a second rider. (R., pp.146-151.) During his initial assessment at IDOC,
staff determined Mr. Hall “has significant mental health needs that can only be provided at our
most substantial mental health setting. The offender will receive a traditional rider opportunity
in conjunction with concurrent mental health services . . .” (R., p.153.) After successfully
completing a second rider, Mr. Hall was returned to probation supervision in May of 2015.
(R., pp.156-161.)
For some time, Mr. Hall performed well and made strides, however in early 2017,
Kootenai County officers filed a probation violation, alleging Mr. Hall consumed alcohol and
drugs and possessed a controlled substance. (R., pp.168-169.) His probation officer at that time
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recommended retained jurisdiction, and upon Mr. Hall’s admissions to the violations, the court
revoked his probation and retained jurisdiction, sending him on a third rider known as the
“Cincinnati program.” (R., pp.168, 186; Tr., p.5, Ls.4-12.) As a result of his Kootenai County
conduct, Twin Falls County filed an affidavit in support of a second probation violation based
upon admitted alcohol use and possession of methamphetamine. (R., p.175.) Mr. Hall admitted
the probation violation allegations on October 16, 2017. (R., p.205.) When the parties came
back to court in Twin Falls County in October, 2017, Mr. Hall sought a continuance and
requested to be considered for mental health court in Kootenai County, where he intended to
live. (R., p.206.) At the next hearing, December 2017, the State moved to continue the case
such that the judge appearing at the October 2017 hearing could preside. That October 24, 2017,
hearing appeared to have been that particular court’s first appearance on this 2011 case.
(R., pp.2-15, 217.)
The disposition hearing finally occurred on January 5, 2018. Although Mr. Hall had
previously requested mental health court consideration, his counsel informed the court he made
contact with the Kootenai County specialty courts prosecutor after sending e-mails and faxes, but
an evaluation or decision regarding mental health court was pending. (R., p.206.) (Tr., p.4, L.8 –
p.5, L.19.) Nonetheless, neither the parties nor the court sought to continue the hearing. The
court maintained:
Well, it doesn’t sounds like – I’ve read the presentence materials. There is no
evidence here he is likely to be accepted by mental health court. He doesn’t have
multiple mental health hospitalizations. There’s no definite mental health issues I
can see. We went through this before when he was in front of me, and that was
back in, what, October? He doesn’t have an entitlement to be in a specialty court.
It’s a privilege, and he’s the one that says he wanted it. He’s the one that should
have followed through on it. I don’t think he is acceptable anyway. So unless I
hear otherwise, it seems to me that it’s time for us to proceed at this point. So are
the parties ready to proceed on disposition?
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(Tr., p.5, L.20 – p.6, L.9.)
During the hearing, counsel called Mr. Hall as a witness to testify, and filed a sentencing
statement which listed some of his mental health diagnoses, including PTSD, bipolar, ADHD
and Major Depressive Disorder. (R., pp.211-212.) Mr. Hall testified that upon release from
custody, he planned to at Crossroads Transitional Housing in Coeur d’Alene, obtain mental
health and substance abuse treatment, and secure another job in car detailing.

(Tr., p.13, L.19-

p.14, L.16.) The court took judicial notice of a 2011 Mental Health Assessment, as well as all of
the presentence materials and all of the presentence investigation addendums. (Tr., p.22, Ls.1317.) The district court summarily concluded Mr. Hall suffered from no mental health issues and
was a “career criminal,” revoked his probation and imposed sentence.

(R., pp.223-224.)

Mr. Hall then filed a timely appeal. (R., p.227.)

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. Hall’s probation and executed his
underlying sentence of eight years?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Hall’s Probation And Executed
His Underlying Sentence
Mr. Hall asserts the district court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation and
executed his original sentence after failing to fully consider Mr. Hall’s mental health,
disregarding positive evidence in mitigation, and imposing upon Mr. Hall a derogatory and
unsupported psychological label, describing him as having been a “career criminal” since being a
juvenile who had not “learned anything at all.” (Tr., p.35, Ls.4-8.) The standards of this Court’s
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review for such claims on appeal are set forth in the Idaho Court of Appeals’ opinion in State v.
Beckett:
Idaho Code § 20-222 prescribes that revocation of probation is within the
discretion of the court and may occur at any time during the probation, if the
probationer violates any of the terms of the probation. In making its decision, the
court examines whether the probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and is
consistent with the protection of society. State v. Hass, 114 Idaho 554, 558, 758
P.2d 713, 717 (Ct.App.1988). The court may, after a probation violation has been
proven, order the suspended sentence to be executed or, in the alternative, the
court is authorized under I.C.R. 35 to reduce the sentence. State v. Marks, 116
Idaho 976, 977, 783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct.App.1989). On review, the appellate court
must determine whether the district court acted within the boundaries of its
discretion, consistent with any legal standards applicable to its specific choices,
and whether the district court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.
State v. Hass, supra.
122 Idaho 324, 325 (Ct. App. 1992). On review of a revocation order, the appellate court must
determine whether the district court acted within the boundaries of its discretion, consistent with
any legal standards applicable to specific choices, and whether the district court reached its
decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Drennen, 122 Idaho 1019, 1021 (Ct. App. 1992).
Here, the court abused its discretion by failing to exercise reason when determining whether to
continue Mr. Hall on probation. Specifically, the district court failed to consider Mr. Hall’s
documented mental health concerns, unreasonably penalized Mr. Hall as a “career criminal” with
“anti-social personality disorder” despite insufficient evidence to support the same, and ignored a
plethora of mitigation evidence demonstrating that rehabilitation efforts had been working.
At the disposition hearing, the district court commented at length, on multiple occasions,
its belief that Mr. Hall did NOT actually have any mental health issues:
I’m going to first address these alleged mental issues, and the reason I want to do
that is we’re going to clear the air once and for all. We have absolutely zero
evidence that you have any mental health issues. . . .
(Tr., p.28, L.25 – p.29, L.3.) (emphasis added.) Later, the court stated:
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His secondary diagnosis is alcohol dependence. The reason I bring that up is
we keep hearing about this mental health stuff. [Y]ou would never have been
accepted to mental health court, ever, with a personality disorder diagnosis
alone. You do not have an Axis I diagnosis, period. So we’ve got to get that
out of the way.
(Tr., p.29, Ls.14-20)
I continued this matter to allow you to make your application to mental health
court, even though at the time I told you there was no basis for you to be in
mental health court, but I let you do that. Now, what happened, I don’t know.
But antisocial personality disorder is not a mental health diagnosis. It is the way
in which you conduct your life, and it is not treatable, and they do not take them
in mental health court, period.
(Tr., p.35, L.20 – p.36, L.3.) Lastly, the court commented:
I want to make (sic) also, number one, there are no mental health issues. At all.
You don’t have any evidence of that.
(Tr., p.32, Ls.20-23.) The district court’s finding was clearly in error, as there was ample
evidence in the record, including recent evidence and testimony, of Mr. Hall’s ADHD, PTSD,
depression, anxiety, and bipolar disorder.
The most recent Addendum to Presentence Investigation, dated September 9, 2017, was
prepared after Mr. Hall’s participation in a rider just months before the disposition hearing. 1 It
includes a section on mental health.
Mental Health: CHMS-2
The offender currently receives mental health treatment through IDOC and has a
level of care (LOC) of CMHS-2. This level of care indicates the offender is
receiving psychotropic medication(s) and has been assessed as stable by an IDOC
clinician. . . . The offender may request to see a clinician as needed but . . . does
not require regular scheduled follow up by clinical staff other than psychiatry and
does not require placement in a specialized unit for mental health treatment. . . .
1

Mr. Hall files simultaneous hereto a Motion to Augment, to include in the record both the April
15, 2015, and the September 4, 2017, Addendums to Presentence Investigation with attached
correspondence, which were considered and referenced by the court at the January 5, 2018,
disposition hearing. (See Disposition Hearing Transcript, p.22-23, and Admit/Deny Hearing
Transcript at p.5, Ls.8-25.) Mr. Hall will hereafter refer to the report from April 15, 2015, as
“APSI 2,” and the report from September 4, 2017, as “APSI 3.”
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he will be released from our facility with a 30-day supply of their prescribed
medications and a prescription for an additional 30 days.
(APSI 3, pp.5-6.) Upon this rider completion, Mr. Hall reported to IDOC his plan was to
continue on medication and seek provider care. (APSI 3, p.6.) Prior reports also reflect his
mental health issues.
Mr. Hall presented a comprehensive report at his original sentencing which had been
conducted by the Idaho Division of Vocational Rehabilitation revealing symptoms of ADHD, a
low average IQ score, ADHD, polysubstance dependence, mood disorder, anxiety disorder,
mathematics disorder, personality disorder, and borderline intellectual functioning. (PSI, pp.12,
48-49.)

When Mr. Hall was placed on his riders, the IDOC intake forms acknowledged

Mr. Hall’s mental health needs affected his placement. (R., pp.92, 153.) When Mr. Hall was
assessed at the time of his 2011 crime, a GAIN completed by Preferred Child & Family Services,
Inc., listed the following under Axis I:

alcohol and amphetamine dependence, both with

physiological symptoms and in sustained full remission, mood disorder other otherwise
specified, and generalized anxiety disorder. The Axis I also included “Rule-Out” PTSD, acute
stress disorder or other disorder and ADHD – Combined Type. (PSI, pp.51-52.) There is also a
2008 psychological evaluation concluding Mr. Hall’s Axis I as including ADHD, polysubstance
abuse, mood disorder, anxiety disorder and mathematics disorder.
Despite that the aforementioned documentation clearly evidenced mental health issues,
the district court failed to consider Mr. Hall’s mental health issues at disposition, contrary to law.
Moreover, the court made an erroneous summary conclusion that Mr. Hall suffered from no
mental health issues. This was unsupported by substantial and competent evidence. See State v.
Wharton, 162 Idaho 666, 670, reh'g denied (Oct. 3, 2017) (“This Court will not set aside factual
findings unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 659, 152 P.3d 16, 20
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(2007). To be found clearly erroneous, factual findings must be unsupported by substantial and
competent evidence.”) Even assuming one were to argue on review that deference to the district
court dictates the assumption that the court properly considered, but then rejected Mr. Hall’s
mental health or the severity of his mental health at disposition, the district court’s emphatic
statements clearly contradict the same. The court did not state it found Mr. Hall had some
mental health challenges that did not rise to the level of affecting the court’s decision at
disposition; rather, the court flatly rejected the mere existence of mental health issues. There is
no statement within the disposition transcript that the court gave even 1% benefit of the doubt to
Mr. Hall for his mental health and lifelong issues.
To compound matters, the district court parsed through the record to find a mental health
assessment upon which to unreasonably label and punish Mr. Hall, meanwhile denying he
actually had mental health issues.

It took particular efforts to capitalize on an outdated

Antisocial Personality diagnosis that was based upon minimal information and was not reflective
of Mr. Hall’s present state by reciting page 6 of an 8 page September, 2011, Mental Health
Report prepared by a Licensed Clinical Social Worker (“LCSW”), where the author concluded
Mr. Hall’s primary diagnosis was Antisocial Personality Disorder (“ASP”) based upon the
following:
He said he was in a fourth or fifth grade the first time he was in trouble for
stealing. He also reported charges of aggravated battery, check fraud, false
impersonation as a minor. By his report he participated in deceitfulness related to
check fraud and false impersonation. His Idaho Repository also shows a
disregard for safety including DUI charges and traffic safety issues.
(PSI, p.39.) The foregoing is the extent of factual support for an ASP, other than conclusions.
Antisocial Personality Disorder first appears in the section titled, “Financial Status.”
Todd DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE a functional limitation in his financial
management due to a mental illness; however he does appear to have some
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financial issues relate to his substance abuse dependence and antisocial
personality disorder. According to the DSM-IV TR the criteria for antisocial
personality disorder includes “impulsivity or failure to plan ahead” and
“consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by repeated failure to sustain consistent
work behavior or honor financial obligations.”
(PSI, p.36.) (emphasis in original) Further down, the LCSW states:
It seems that his antisocial personality disorder may be impacting his housing
though as he is currently at the Twin Falls County Jail.
(PSI, p.36.) This report from 2011 has insufficient factual support for a district court, seven
years later, to summarily conclude a person has ASP. While Mr. Hall concedes the 2008
Mountain States report also lists ASP as a possible Axis II diagnosis, this is only in addition to
the Axis I diagnosis. That fact that he possessed some “prominent antisocial personality traits”
does not categorically equate to a 2018 diagnosis for antisocial personality disorder. Here, the
district court failed to recognize its lack of expert status as a psychological diagnostician.
Mr. Hall is unaware of evidence indicating that this particular court had any significant history or
knowledge of Mr. Hall prior to these disposition hearings such to opine at length on his mental
state. (R., pp.1-13.) Yet the court improperly injected its own personal opinions and biases
regarding ASP. According to the district court, ASP is not a mental illness, it is not treatable,
and it is directly linked to people who incur convictions for driving without privileges.
I’m actually fairly well known over in Ada County for pointing out that when I
see somebody with multiple driving without privileges, it tells me they are likely
to have antisocial personality disorder, which you do. And that’s not treatable, for
the record.
(Tr., p.30, Ls.2-7.) To the contrary, developing an accurate mental health diagnosis would
seemingly require consideration of a multitude of current factors and cannot be gleaned from a
stale, minimal report from 2011. Even Mr. Hall’s childhood trauma based upon his father’s
abuse should have been considered. Here, there was insufficient information before the district
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court to consider diagnostic factors such as whether Mr. Hall had a repetitive and persistent
pattern of behavior before age 15 where he violated the basis rights of others or major ageappropriate societal norms or the effect of substance abuse, of even rely upon the concise and
stale nature of the 2011 report. It was simply inappropriate and beyond the court’s discretion to
make a determination on its own that, in 2018, Mr. Hall had a personality disorder, meanwhile
disregarding the DSM-5 and Mr. Hall’s progress.
And that the district court’s ASP label was overly damaging and prejudicial specifically
to Mr. Hall is confirmed by the court’s continued reference to ASP despite information gained
through IDOC demonstrating Mr. Hall’s ability to conform to social norms with respect to lawful
behaviors, plan ahead, show regard for the safety of himself and others, show consistent work
behavior and remorse, evidence a lack of repeated physical fights or assaults, and communicate
with candor with his probation officer. This progress and growth away from any potential
antisocial traits was thoroughly described in the ASPI yet disregarded by the district court.
During Mr. Hall’s first rider, his performance was great. (PSI, pp.66-72.) He received
no formal or informal disciplinary sanctions. (PSI, p.69.) In Moral Reconation Therapy and
other classes, his performance was “excellent” and “above average and respectful.” His anger
management class instructor wrote, “He has done more in this workbook than the others, which
would indicate to me that this is the component that he likes the most.” (PSI, pp.69-70.) Other
comments included “Hall . . . continues to follow every small CAPP rules despite their simplicity
and seemingly repetitive nature” and “his behavior required no prompts or reminders. Hall’s
behavior showed responsibility for his own program and the outcome he will receive.” (PSI,
pp.73, 75.) “I can count on him to always be ready and willing to share in group.” Mr. Hall
“started to own his behaviors and the pain it caused family and friends.” (PSI, p.71.) “Mr. Hall
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has many C-notes from participating in other structured groups which shows that he was willing
to go above what was being asked of him while programming. Mr. Hall would make a great
candidate for probation.” (PSI, p.70.) This behavior is not consistent with someone with ASP
because Mr. Hall was thoughtful of others, respectful, and engaged in positive behavior.
During his second rider, he made similar positive strides, resulting in a probation
recommendation. (APSI 2, p.1.) In the beginning of that program, Mr. Hall was clearly on
medication and staff noted that he appeared to be overmedicated. Mr. Hall then requested to be
taken off of all medication and then became more engaged in groups, to the point that he was a
peer mentor. (APSI 2, p.5.) He was able to display a solid understanding of cognitive selfchange and became an asset to the group. (APSI 2, p.6.) and identify his emotions better. He
was ultimately recommended for continued probation due to his progress and change, including
increased awareness and acceptance of his addiction, ability to use new thinking, ability to
communicate better and set effective boundaries, and fully understand his responsibilities.
(APSI 2, p.8.)
The most recent APSI from Kootenai County in September 2017 also described positive
behavior and progress. (APSI 3.) He was self-reflective, had healthy behaviors within the
classroom, identified positive values, gained new skills, “consistently completed his work on
time and gave valuable input into the group discussions and activities,” engaged in daily group
discussions and activities. (APSI 3, pp.3-5.) “Overall, he was a positive and energetic member
of the group.” (APSI 3, p.4.) The report also mentions his challenges dealing with anxiety and
struggles with reaching out due to fear of looking vulnerable and weak. (APSI 3, pp.3-4.) The
C-Note Summary likewise reveals proof that rehabilitation was working.

“Mr. Hall has

consistently been a volunteer to read, discuss or start conversations. He prepares the room by
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taking down and washing surfaces as he is the first in the room, almost daily. . . He was active in
the Mock Interview activity, helping himself and others improve. (APSI 3, p.8.) Although he
was struggling with feeling sick of being at the facility, “he does well getting his work done on
time and completed.” Id. “When practicing one of the more serious situations he has a tendency
to laugh out of nervousness but he is able to demonstrate all of the skills steps and accurately
complete the role play. . . . has been learning about Cognitive Self-Change and thinking reports.
He has been able to write out an objective situation without biases or judgements.” (APSI 3,
p.12.) He consistently volunteered and his work quality was good. (APSI 3, p.10.) The district
court was familiar with this information as shown by its ability to reference the same report to
highlight a negative aspect regarding Mr. Hall’s discipline within the first few weeks of arriving
for trying to communicate with another female offender, which it considered as evidence of his
ASP that he does not “think the rules apply.” (Tr., p.33, Ls.4-9.) (APSI 3, p.13.)
As a whole, rather than factor his progress, the district court improperly and unreasonably
disregarded the collective information coming from IDOC insofar as it painted Mr. Hall in a
positive light, yet emphasized the same agency’s reports to paint Mr. Hall in a negative light. In
other words, it cast doubt as to the reliability of mitigating information, yet lauded its accuracy as
to the reliability of derogatory information.

This is demonstrated by the district court’s

comments inferring IDOC’s probation recommendations do not carry much weight:
[A] judge is not bound by a recommendation from IDOC. It is nothing more than
a recommendation. . . . . Now, IDOC has been very clever in recent years.
Number one, they don’t recommend relinquishment often. In fact, at one point,
they had to have permission from a supervisor before they could recommend
relinquishment. How do I know? Because they told us that. . . . So that’s why I
know that to be true. In addition, they – the fact is that they don’t recommend
relinquishment very often, and when they do, that’s why it is so significant.
(Tr., p.33, Ls.14-21.)
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Lastly, the court failed to express an awareness that presentence investigation materials
may rely upon hearsay only where there is a basis to believe it is accurate and reliable pursuant
to I.C.R. 32:
NCIC apparently also indicates that the presentence history may not
encompass all of your crimes because NCIC indicates you were arrested
April of 1996 in Nevada for burglary and battery, domestic violence. Doesn’t
show what the disposition is. So the reason I’m reading all this is that you are a
career criminal. You have been a career criminal since you were a juvenile. You
are now a grown person. You are still a career criminal. There is no evidence
that you have learned anything.
Tr., p.34, L.24 – p.35, L.5.) (emphasis added.) The court had no apparent reason to bring up
charged crimes for which the disposition was unknown except to use it, as it did, as aggravating
evidence. Moreover, even if it is appropriate for the district court to consider disciplinary actions
against Mr. Hall during his prison stays, it is improper to afford disciplinary action unwarranted
emphasis, particularly when it highlighted a 1998 case almost 20 years old. (Tr., pp.31-32.) See,
e.g., State v. Izaguirre, 145 Idaho 820, 825 (Ct. App. 2008) (“While an inmate’s disruptive
conduct in jail is a legitimate factor for a sentencing court's consideration, the district court's
reasoning that an additional thirty-five-year term in prison was necessary because of conduct
amounting to misdemeanors is not sound.”)
Even assuming a district court’s focus on some factors in aggravation was warranted, it
did not excuse complete disregard of documented mental health illness and other pro-social
factors. Outside of these pro-social factors contained in the APSI’s, there were several aspects of
Mr. Hall’s character that affected his ability to perform on probation which the district court also
failed to consider. Mr. Hall had a troubled childhood. His parents were not together and he was
the youngest of four. He was skirted between his mother, father, and grandparent’s home, and
his father was physically abusive. Mr. Hall was also picked on by his three sisters. (PSI, p.9.)
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Mr. Hall got into trouble as a teen and was sent to St. Anthony. Nonetheless, he was still able to
obtain his GED and High School Equivalency. (PSI, pp.31-32.) Mr. Hall had also established
supportive contacts through his mother, friends and co-workers. (PSI, p.10.)
Mr. Hall also provided documentation In December of 2013, Mr. Hall’s friend, Carla
Leach, described him as a “good caring man, a hard worker, a great friend and loving father. . .
I’ve never written a letter like this. I’m doing it because I believe in Todd. I know that with a
good support system he can overcome anything.” (Exhibit Log, p.2.) Ricardo Rodriguez, his
boss while employed at Smoke Easy Smoke Shop, stated that Mr. Hall was one of the best
employees he’s ever had, and explained he believed Mr. Hall had a drinking problem that
warranted inpatient treatment. (Exhibit Log, p.5.) Lastly, Mr. Hall presented documentation of
on-line reviews from customers praising his excellent work, which demonstrated his hard work
ethic, professionalism, discipline, and conscientiousness. (Exhibit Log, p.8-10.) Even though
Idaho courts have recognized a defendant’s reliability and dedication as a working member of
society and substance abuse as mitigating factors, the district court here failed to pay this
evidence any heed. See State v. Baiz, 120 Idaho 292, 293 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Nice, 103
Idaho 89, 645 P.2d 323 (1982).
Based upon the foregoing, it is clear the district court failed to properly consider
Mr. Hall’s mental health and other mitigating evidence at the disposition hearing.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Hall respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s order terminating
his probation and reinstate Mr. Hall on his original supervision terms.
DATED this 7th day of September, 2018.

/s/ Lara E. Anderson
LARA E. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 7th day of September, 2018, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, by causing to be placed a copy thereof in the U.S.
Mail, addressed to:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
Delivered via e-mail to: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
LEA/eas
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